How to Bridge the Divide Over the South China Sea
如何彌合南海問題上的分歧

Cui Tiankai, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.
中國(guó)駐美國(guó)大使 崔天凱

June 1, 2016
2016年6月1日

The differences between China and the U.S. over the South China Sea issue have become a matter of concern and even anxiety. But some of the perceptions in the U.S. and elsewhere about China’s policy and intentions in the area are misplaced. A pressing task is to understand the facts and China’s intentions correctly so as to avoid real danger and consequences as a result of misinterpretation and miscalculation.
中美兩國(guó)關(guān)于南海問題的分歧日益引發(fā)關(guān)切甚至焦慮。但在美國(guó)或世界其他地方,對(duì)中國(guó)在南海的舉措和意圖的一些認(rèn)知是錯(cuò)誤的。當(dāng)前一項(xiàng)緊迫的任務(wù)是了解事實(shí),正確解讀中國(guó)意圖,避免由于誤讀誤判引發(fā)真正的危險(xiǎn)和后果。

The issues in the South China Sea revolve around territorial and maritime jurisdiction. China believes it is doing nothing more than maintaining and defending legitimate territorial claims and maritime rights. Reclamation and construction works have taken place on islands and reefs that have long been under China’s control, and many of the facilities are for civilian purposes and public good, such as navigation and rescue services, emergency relief, scientific research, and environmental protection. There are limited defense facilities, but they do not represent a “militarization” of the area. We believe that recent statements and military deployments by the U.S. have had the effect of escalating tension in the region and, if not curbed, risk the very militarization we all wish to avoid.
南海問題的實(shí)質(zhì)是領(lǐng)土和海洋管轄權(quán)爭(zhēng)議。中國(guó)所做的不過是維護(hù)和捍衛(wèi)自身長(zhǎng)期合法的領(lǐng)土主張和海洋權(quán)益。有關(guān)陸域吹填和建設(shè)活動(dòng)是在中國(guó)長(zhǎng)期管控的島礁上進(jìn)行,多數(shù)設(shè)施將用于民事和公益目的,例如,導(dǎo)航服務(wù)、緊急救助、科研與環(huán)保等。一些十分有限的防務(wù)設(shè)施談不上“軍事化”。我們認(rèn)為,正是近來美方的一些言論和軍事部署加劇了地區(qū)緊張。有關(guān)言行如得不到控制,將真正導(dǎo)致我們都希望避免的“軍事化”。

Some people have called on China to abide by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to agree to international arbitration, which was initiated by the Philippines. But these same people are denying China’s rights under the convention. Our view is that the convention does not cover sovereignty and territorial issues – yet the very subject of the arbitration is territorial sovereignty. China will therefore neither participate nor accept the arbitration, for we maintain that the tribunal has no jurisdiction in this realm. Besides, it is ironic that the U.S. seeks to use against us a United Nations convention that it itself has refused to ratify.
有人呼吁中國(guó)遵守《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》,并接受菲律賓提出的國(guó)際仲裁,但正是這些人試圖否定中方根據(jù)《公約》享有的合法權(quán)利。《公約》并不適用于領(lǐng)土主權(quán)問題,而菲方所提仲裁案的核心事關(guān)領(lǐng)土主權(quán)。中方既不會(huì)參與、也不會(huì)接受仲裁,因?yàn)槲覀冋J(rèn)為仲裁庭沒有管轄權(quán)。具有諷刺意味的是,美試圖以《公約》來指責(zé)中方,但迄今仍拒絕批準(zhǔn)《公約》。

The concept of freedom of navigation is frequently used to justify actions by the U.S. in the South China Sea. This is an additional irony. The U.S. has used “freedom-of-navigation” operations to challenge the very concept as it was defined by the convention, believing treaty provisions would restrict its navy’s ability to move freely around the world.
“航行自由”概念經(jīng)常被美方用作在南海采取行動(dòng)的理由, 這同樣是個(gè)諷刺。美開展“航行自由行動(dòng)”正是為了挑戰(zhàn)《公約》對(duì)航行自由的界定,美認(rèn)為《公約》有關(guān)規(guī)定約束了美海軍在全球的行動(dòng)自由能力。

Worst of all, China’s policy on the South China Sea has been grossly misperceived as a strategic move to challenge U.S. dominance in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Some people even go so far as to raise the idea of a so-called Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine. However, China believes that the concept of sphere of influence is out-of-date in the 21st century. China consistently strives for regional cooperation, and we respect America’s traditional presence and legitimate interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The reality is not that China is trying to drive anyone out, but that there are attempts to deny China’s legitimate and expanding interests in its own region.
最糟的是,中國(guó)在南海的舉措被嚴(yán)重誤讀,被視為挑戰(zhàn)美在亞太乃至全球主導(dǎo)權(quán)的戰(zhàn)略性行動(dòng)。一些人甚至擔(dān)心出現(xiàn)所謂的亞洲版“門羅主義”。但中方認(rèn)為,“勢(shì)力范圍”說在21世紀(jì)已經(jīng)過時(shí)。中國(guó)一貫致力于地區(qū)合作。我們尊重美國(guó)在亞太地區(qū)的傳統(tǒng)存在和合法利益。事實(shí)并非中方想把任何人排擠出去,而是有些人試圖否定中國(guó)在本地區(qū)合法和不斷擴(kuò)展的權(quán)益。

Indeed, China has long called for peaceful and direct negotiations directly with relevant claimant states to manage and eventually resolve the South China Sea disputes. This remains unchanged – just as we remain open to working to forge a code of conduct for the region with the 10 ASEAN countries.
中國(guó)一貫主張與有關(guān)爭(zhēng)議國(guó)通過直接的和平談判來管控乃至最終解決南海爭(zhēng)議,這一立場(chǎng)沒有改變。中方對(duì)與10個(gè)東盟成員國(guó)共同努力,制定南海行為準(zhǔn)則也持開放態(tài)度。

China-U.S. relations are too important for us to allow them to be hijacked by the South China Sea issue. We may have major differences, but we also share important interests, including maintaining regional peace and stability, supporting freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law, and resolving disputes through peaceful negotiations and diplomatic dialogue. The region should not become a competing ground for China and the U.S. In fact, we have significant potential for cooperation in this region and beyond. Witness our coast guards, which patrolled jointly to enforce the fishery rules in the western Pacific.
中美關(guān)系如此重要,我們不能允許其被南海問題所綁架。雙方可能存在一些重大分歧,但也擁有重要的共同利益。雙方均主張維護(hù)地區(qū)和平與穩(wěn)定,支持根據(jù)國(guó)際法開展航行和飛越自由,支持通過和平談判和外交對(duì)話解決爭(zhēng)議。南海不應(yīng)成為中美兩國(guó)的博弈場(chǎng)。事實(shí)上,中美在本地區(qū)及世界其它地區(qū)合作潛力很大。中美兩國(guó)海警曾在西太平洋開展聯(lián)合漁業(yè)執(zhí)法行動(dòng)就是個(gè)例證。

The good news is that leaders in China and the United States have demonstrated the political will to manage our differences and keep them under control. We continue to talk. We on the Chinese side are ready to work in a constructive manner – and we are hopeful that the U.S. will demonstrate the same spirit.
當(dāng)前,中美兩國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人均表明了妥處分歧、管控局勢(shì)的政治意愿,這是好消息。中美雙方正就此持續(xù)進(jìn)行對(duì)話。中方愿展示建設(shè)性姿態(tài),希望美方也能體現(xiàn)同樣的精神。?